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Abstract 
Genocide is universally accepted as an intemational crime, the prohibition of which constituting 
a jus cogens norm of intemational law. However, the duty to prevent genocide, as contained in the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was left largely unexplored 
for more than forty years after the Convention was signed in 1948. Thus, the nature, scope and ambit 
of the duty is instrumental to the debate on humanitarian intervention in response to genocide - does 
the Convention, in light of its recognition of genocide as an international crime, require intervention of 
a military or non-military nature in order to prevent or halt the commission of the crime, or does it 
simply obligate state parties to 'take care of their own backyard' and thus merely enable them to bring 
genocide committed outside their sphere of interest to the attention of the United Nations if they so 
wish? 
This paper seeks to evaluate the extent of the duty prevent, both at the time the Convention was 
signed and also through the effect of subsequent state practice, to determine whether there appears to 
be an emerging rule of customary international law that establishes an obligation to intervene. The 
tragic events of the Rwandan genocide are considered as the primary case study. It compares the 
actions taken by the intemational community at the outbreak of violence next to those taken in other 
contemporary conflicts in an attempt to deduce an emerging pattern in contemporary state practice. As 
a result, the paper takes the position that if such an obligation exists, it is one that must rightfully lie 
with the United Nations, as the legitimate representative of all states, bearing in mind the established 
principles goveming the non use of force other than in self defence, or if mandated by the Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. A state's individual duty to prevent 
genocide occurring outside their territorial interests would then extend to a requirement to support any 
United Nations intervention in response to it. Ultimately however, these arguments to date lack settled, 
state practice to support them - something that needs to be addressed if the intemational community is 
to truly realise and enforce the erga omnes obligation to prevent genocide. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, abstract, footnotes, appendix and 
bibliography) comprises approximately 12,589 words. 
LAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
The United States and the international community must take action. If the horrors of the Holocaust 
taught us anything, it is the high costs of remaining silent and paralysed in the face of genocide. 
President Clinton, on the war in Bosnia, 4 August 1992' 
The international community ... must bear its share of responsibility for this tragedy , as well. We did not 
act quickly enough after the killing began. We should not have allowed the refugee camps to become 
safe havens for the killers. We did not immediately call these crimes by their rightful name: genocide . 
. . . We owe to all the people in the world our best efforts to organize ourselves so that we can maximize 
the chances of preventing these events. And where they cannot be prevented, we can move more quickly 
to minimize the horror. 
President Clinton, on the Rwandan genocide, 25 March 19982 
I INTRODUCTION 
On 6 April 1994, savagery unmatched smce World War II engulfed Rwanda 
while a subdued international community watched from afar for the ensuing 100 days. 
It was orchestrated by the few, yet carried out by the many, leaving in the finish at 
least 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu Rwandans murdered - one third of which were 
children, not to mention the over one million wounded and maimed.3 These were the 
high costs of remaining silent and paralysed in the face of genocide that President 
Clinton preached of two years prior. Yet, to his Administration in 1994, this was 
"black on black" violence in which the West should not intervene; it was not 
genocide, but rather "tribal hatred" and a "breakdown of the ceasefire agreement" 
from the recently resolved civil war.4 At best the Administration would concede that 
"acts of genocide may have occurred", but not genocide itself. 5 
Much has been said about the failure of the international community, notably the 
United States and the United Nations Security Council, to intervene in order to halt 
the violence and killing. If the law and politics concerning the use of military force 
for the purposes of humanitarian intervention were being re-evaluated after the 
1 See "Um, Was It Something l Said?" (14 February 1994) Time Magazine New York 14. 
2 Bill Clinton, President of the United States (Speech to genocide survivors, Kigali Airport, Rwanda, 
25 March 1998) reproduced in US Department of State International Information Programs 
"Transcript: Clinton Meets with Rwandan Genocide Survivors" <http://usinfo. state.go, /products/ 
pdq/pdq.htm> (last accessed 13 July 2002). 
3 Gerard Prunier The Rwanda Crisis 1959-/994: History of a Genocide (Hurst & Co, London, 1995) 
261-265. 
4 Reasoning of the Clinton Administration and British Foreign Office, cited in Geoffrey Robertson 
Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice (Penguin Group, Middlesex, 2000) 72. 
5 Mike McCurry, US State Department Spokesperson (25 May 1994) Press Briefing <http://www.pbs. 
org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/etc/slaughter.html> (last accessed 28 August 2002). For detail 
on the controversy over this formulation see also Philip Gourevitch We Wish to !11for111 You that 
Tomorrow We will be Killed with Our Families (Farrar Straus and Giroux, ew York, 1998) 152; 
and see below Part Ill B I April to June 1994: to charge or not to charge genocide. 
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embarrassment of Mogadishu in 1993, then why were non-military counter-measures 
not seen as a viable alternative? For example, if the United Nations was determined to 
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, why then did it not authorise 
jamming of the airwaves in the face of direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide by Radio Television Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) if military 
intervention could not be achieved? 
Perhaps the question is better focused on why the international community was so 
reluctant to call this situation by its rightful name: genocide. One argument - one this 
paper will advance - is that such acknowledgement was believed to be tantamount to 
an admission they had an obligation to intervene by dint of the command in Article I 
of the Genocide Convention which places a duty upon states "to prevent" genocide.
6 
By avoiding a declaration that genocide was taking place, it was possible to 
circumvent the Convention obligations. What is interesting for the purposes of this 
paper are the deeper implications of such an act - if customary international law is 
reflective of state practice, and the Genocide Convention is reflective of customary, 
international law, with genocide constituting a jus cogens crime, then could the 
deliberate avoidance of affirming Rwanda was in the midst of a genocide be seen to 
be implicit recognition for the existence in customary international law of a legal 
obligation to intervene in response to genocide itself? 
This paper will traverse the legal, political, and moral implications of the duty to 
prevent, as established by the Genocide Convention, in an attempt to answer these 
questions. Subsequent practice, including state action, judicial interpretation, and 
contemporary academic commentary following its coming into force, will be analysed 
in order to assess the development of the ambit and nature of the duty to prevent 
genocide. The impact of this on the law and politics of humanitarian intervention, 
both of a military and non-military character, will then be explored. The aim is to 
show how intervention was not only justified and legal in the case of Rwanda, but 
also how Rwanda sets a precedent to ensure intervention is not withheld in 
subsequent cases of genocide. Perhaps then future actions of world leaders will live 
up to the promises of their impassioned rhetoric. 
6 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (9 December 1948) 78 
UNTS 277, art I. The Preamble and Articles I-IX of the Convention are appended to the end of this 
paper. 
II LEGAL OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 
There can be little argument that the principles espoused in the Genocide 
Convention have made their way into the corpus of customary international law. It is 
equally clear that the crime of genocide is universally condemned and cannot go 
unpunished. Further, General Assembly Resolution 96(!) of 1946, in calling for the 
drafting of a convention on genocide, noted that as this was an act "contrary to moral 
law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations", international co-operation 
should be organised "with a view to facilitating the speedy prevention ... " of this 
crime. 7 This notion of prevention survived the drafting sessions to be enshrined in the 
final draft not only in the text, but placed alongside the aim of punishment in its title. 
Following the tragedy of Rwanda, academic commentators commonly, and 
somewhat boldly, asserted that the duty of prevention under the Genocide Convention 
obligated parties to it to intervene in response to genocide,8 and by failing to do so 
the international community had breached the Convention's commands. Thus, the 
need to determine the scope, ambit, and effect of this duty on the obligations of 
contracting parties is instrumental to this debate. 
A The Drafting History 
During the drafting sess10n debates, the Polish representative commented that 
"victims of genocide could derive but meagre satisfaction from seeing the guilty 
persons brought to justice after the crime has been committed; it would be better to 
prevent the crime from being committed."9 Nevertheless, in spite of a purely punitive 
regime not being favoured by the contracting parties to the Convention, there was still 
little in it to suggest what prevention of genocide actually meant. 10 Rules of 
interpretation under the Jaw of treaties can assist in this situation: any interpretation 
7 GA Res 96(1) ( 11 December 1946) UN Doc N64/ Add.1 . 
8 For example: "The genocide convention ... imposed a legal obligation on those states who ratified it 
to intervene whenever genocide was suspected" Linda Melvern "Genocide Behind the Thin Blue 
Line" (1997) 28(3) Security Dialogue 333, 333-334; "the December 1948 international convention 
on the repression of genocides ... made it mandatory for any of its signatories to take immediate 
action once a genocide had been clearly identified" Gerard Prunier The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: 
History of a Genocide (Hurst & Co, London, 1995) 274-275. 
9 Continuation of the Consideration of the Draft Convention on Genocide (61h Comm, 3d Sess, 841h 
Mtg, 1948) UN GAOR 241. 
10 William A Schabas Genocide in International law: The Crime of Crimes (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2000) 72. 
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must be in accord "with the ordinary meaning to be given to the tem1S of the treaty in 
their context and in light of the treaty's object and purpose." If this meaning is 
ambiguous, recourse may also be had to the preparatory work of the treaty and the 
circumstances surrounding its conclusion.
11 Such recourse in this case should, in the 
very least, help to discover what the duty to prevent does not entail. 
1 The 'duty to prevent' under the Secretariat draft 
To begin with, the Secretariat draft proposed the criminalisation of preparatory 
acts such as: 12 
(a) studies and research for the purpose of developing the technique of genocide; 
(b) setting up of installations, manufacturing, obtaining, possessing or supplying of 
articles or substances with the knowledge that they are intended for genocide; 
(c) issuing instructions or orders, and distributing tasks with a view to committing 
genocide 
By their very nature, these prohibitions are inherently preventative m form and 
substance, in spite of their equally punitive measure. Should they have survived the 
drafting debates 13 and been included in the Convention itself, then the question of· 
obligatory intervention could have been obscured by arguments that the treaty's true 
object and purpose centred around the move to stamp genocide out at its source by 
punitive sanction for all possible acts that may culminate in genocide. In this situation 
there would not be a need for intervention because the planned genocide would never 
take place. Of course, while this argument may reflect the ideals of the draft 
Convention, it does not reflect reality when most commonly evidence of preparatory 
acts does not come to light until after the genocide has begun. 
With its deletion, the duty of prevention became more equivocal. The other two 
preventative provisions, paragraph 3 of the preamble and Article XII, are particularly 
interesting. The former stated that the Contracting Parties "pledge themselves to 
11 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (22 May 1969) 1155 UNTS 331 , arts 31-32. 
12 Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide (May 1947) UN Doc E/447, art Il(I)(2)(a-c). See also 
Pieter Drost Genocide: United Nations Legislation on International Criminal Law (A W Sythoff, 
Leyden , I 959) 8-28 for detailed commentary on the draft; the text of the draft is reproduced in 
Schabas, above, 553 (appendix). 
13 In fact, the deletion of preparatory acts by the Ad Hoe Committee centred round the belief that 
serious cases of such acts would be caught by the provisions covering conspiracy and complicity in 
genocide. It was further suggested that attempt and incitement to genocide could also encompass 
preparatory acts. See generally Report of the Ad Hoe Committee on Genocide to the Economic and 
Social Council on the Meetings of the Committee Held at Lake Success (5 April - 10 May 1948) 7 
UN ESCOR Supp (No. 6) 2; (1948) UN Doc E/794. 
prevent and to repress such acts wherever they may occur." This was substituted in 
the preamble of the Ad Hoe Committee draft14 with, "[t]he High Contracting 
Parties ... agree to prevent and punish the crime", and then deleted altogether from the 
preamble of the final text of the Convention in favour of proclaiming genocide "a 
crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish" via 
Article I. While the debates over just where this provision should be inserted have 
attracted much attention, 15 comparably little commentary has resulted over the 
deletion of the original phrase "to repress such acts wherever they may occur" 
(emphasis added). It seems on the plain and ordinary meaning to be given to these 
terms that intervention, whether military or not, was expressly anticipated by this 
additional duty "to repress." Furthermore, arguments that obligations are only 
intended to be territorially based, 16 and therefore excluding intervention by any non-
interested party to the conflict, are ruled out by the extension of this duty to "acts 
wherever they may occur." Should this phrase have remained the culpability of the 
international community for failing to halt the genocide in Rwanda would arguably 
have been beyond dispute. 
The question then becomes of what impact does its deletion have on the duty to 
prevent genocide? During the Sixth Committee proceedings on the consideration of 
the Ad Hoe Committee draft, Mr Kaeckenbeeck of Belgium proposed that the duty to 
prevent and punish in the Ad Hoe Committee preamble should be transferred to 
Article I in order to strengthen the obligation by substituting "for a purely declaratory 
statement a solemn commitment, of practical import, to prevent and suppress the 
crime" ( emphasis added). 17 Clearly the Belgium representative viewed the Ad Hoe 
Committee wording as also encompassing a commitment to suppress (or repress) 
genocide. As this proposal was adopted, and Article I accordingly modified, 18 one 
could conclude that the duty to repress had been amalgamated into the duty to prevent 
in the final version of the Convention. 
14 The Ad Hoe Committee was created by the UN Economic and Social Council in early 1948 to 
prepare a draft convention based on its consideration of the Secretariat draft and other preliminary 
drafts prepared by Member Governments on the Committee. See generally Schabas, above, chp 2. 
15 Two such sources are Schabas, above, chp 2; Matthew Lippman "The 1948 Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Forty-Five Years Later" ( 1994) 8 Temp JCLJ 
I, 20-22. 
16 These are explored below in Part II B 2 a Reasoning of Judge Lauterpacht. 
17 Continuation of the Consideration of the Draft Convention on Genocide (61h Comm, 3d Sess, 67'h 
Mtg, 1948) UN GAOR 44. See also Lippman, above, 21. 
18 Consideration of the Draft Convention, above, 681h Mtg, 53. 
7 
8 
The mere deletion of words from a treaty clause is not necessarily fatal to the 
purpose for which they were originally included. One recent example is the finding of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda that in spite of the decision by the 
drafters of the Genocide Convention to delete a reference to the ability of direct and 
public incitement to be punished whether it is successful or not, it was nevertheless 
"of the opinion that it cannot thereby be inferred that the intent of the drafters was not 
to punish unsuccessful acts of incitement ... [they] simply decided not to specifically 
mention that such a form of incitement could be punished."
19 This ruling was based 
on the premise that incitement, like conspiracy and complicity, is an inchoate offence 
and so, irrespective of the result, it is punishable by virtue of the criminal act alone. 
Such an interpretation therefore fell within the object and purpose of the Genocide 
Convention, and was an implicit meaning of the term. By the same token, one could 
also say the drafters decided not to specifically mention that intervention as a form of 
prevention may be required, and as the Convention was designed "to liberate mankind 
from such an odious scourge",
20 then interpreting the duty to prevent as inclusive of, 
in the very least, a right to intervene may also be implicitly permissible. 
2 Turning the Secretariat's Article XII into Article VIII of the Convention 
Article XII of the Secretariat draft states: 
Action by the United Nations to Prevent or Stop Genocide 
Irrespective of any provision in the foregoing articles, should the crimes as defined in 
this Convention be committed in any part of the world, or should there be serious 
reasons for suspecting that such crimes have been committed, the High Contracting 
Parties may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take measures 
for the suppression or prevention of such crimes. 
In such case the said Parties shall do everything in their power to give full effect to 
the intervention of the United Nations. 
Building on the above arguments, the term "suppression" was carried through to 
Article VIII of the final Convention. This could be taken to mean that in spite of 
deleting the preamble's express reference to the duty to repress, this did not amount to 
an outright rejection of the ability to intervene for the purposes of suppression of 
genocide in appropriate cases. 
19 Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu (1998) ICTR 96-4-T, para 561. 
2° Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (9 December 1948) 78 
UNTS 277, preamble. 
The commentary to the Secretariat draft reveals that Article XII was intended to 
facilitate preventative action by the United Nations before the onset of a catastrophe 
that could cause irreparable harm. It noted that the Convention should "bind" the 
states to do all that is possible to support any United Nations undertaking to prevent 
or stop genocide because, "if preventive action is to have the maximum chances of 
success, the Members of the United Nations must not remain passive or indifferent."21 
By the very wording of Article XII and its commentary, United Nations intervention 
was envisioned as justified and necessary within the context of genocide. 
Ultimately however, the last paragraph of Article XII was removed in its entirety, 
and the first was modified in favour of a more modest and general text largely put 
forward by China.22 It must be remembered that the UN Charter had only been 
signed two years prior, laying down specific principles concerning the prohibition on 
the use of force [Art 2(4)] except when in self defence [Art 51], and the principle of 
non-intervention in the internal affairs of another state [Art 2(7)]. Thus, the preference 
for a more modest approach, which leaves the possibility of intervention as more 
implicit rather than explicit, is understandable. Yet, the notion of intervention was not 
the focal point of the heated debate that took place over this provision. Rather, it was 
an unsuccessful proposal originally put forward by the Soviet Union to the Ad Hoe 
Committee that was looked on as a move to attribute powers and duties on the 
Security Council that were not mandated by the Charter. 
This defeated proposal was revised by the Soviet delegation and resubmitted to 
the Sixth Committee:23 
The High Contracting Parties undertake to report to the Security Council all cases 
of genocide and all cases of a breach of the obligations imposed by the Convention 
so that the necessary measures may be taken in accordance with Chapter VI of the 
United Nations Charter. 
After consultation with France over its own submission,24 and finally with Iran, the 
proposal was then further revised and submitted as a tripartite amendment reading: 25 
21 Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, Commentary of the UN Secretary-General ( 1947) UN 
Doc E/447 , 45-46. 
22 See "Draft Articles for the Inclusion in the Convention on Genocide Proposed by the Delegation of 
China on 16 April 1948" UN Doc E/AC.25/9: "Any Signatory to this Convention may call upon any 
competent organ of the United Nations to take such action as may be appropriate under the Charter 
for the prevention and suppression of genocide." 
23 Continuation of the Consideration of the Draft Convention on Genocide (6'h Comm, 3d Sess, 94•h 
Mtg, 1948) UN GAOR 328; UN Doc A/C.6/215/ Rev. I (Mr Morozov, USSR). 
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The High Contracting Parties may call the attention of the Security Council or, if 
necessary, of the General Assembly to the cases of genocide and of violations of 
the present Convention likely to constitute a threat to international peace and 
security, in order that the Security Council may take such measures as it may deem 
necessary to stop that threat. 
The first rev1s1on clearly did not env1S1on the Security Council resorting to 
Chapter VII enforcement measures that could countenance military intervention for it 
specifically directs the Council's attention to the pacific settlement procedures of 
Chapter VI.26 However, its strength is seen in its ability to not only require states to 
report cases of genocide, but to further compel them to bring all breaches of 
Convention obligations to the Council's attention as well. Such a strict supervisory 
regime "would highlight the importance attached to the suppression of genocide. "
27 
However, in order to preserve the reference to the Security Council, the 
concessions made in the tripartite amendment are immediately apparent. It limits 
reportable breaches to only those likely to constitute a threat to international peace 
and security, while replacing the obligatory notification regime with a purely 
voluntary one for not only the Parties but also the Security Council. While specific 
reference to the Council was dropped in the final Article VIII in favour of generally 
empowering the "competent organs of the United Nations" to act, the voluntary 
notification system was maintained for Contracting Parties. Thus, while the 
amendment's expansion of the range of measures available to all those "necessary" 
for the suppression of genocide is affirmed, but rephrased, in Article VIII to all those 
the UN organs "consider appropriate", this tacit approval of intervention cannot be 
equated to an obligation on behalf of the United Nations to intervene, or on 
Contracting Parties to call for such intervention. On the plain and ordinary meaning of 
24 The French proposal read: "The High Contracting Parties may call the attention of the 
Security 
Council to the cases of genocide and of violations of the present Convention likely to con
stitute a 
threat to international peace and security in order that the Security Council may take such m
easures 
as it deems necessary to stop the threat." (1948) UN Doc A/C.6/259 (Mr Chaumont, France)
. 
25 Consideration of the Draft Convention, above, I 02"d Mtg, 421 . 
26 But see comments of Mr Morozov prior to making this revision in support of possible Cha
pter VII 
action: "Any act of genocide was always a threat to international peace and security and
 as such 
should be dealt with under Chapters VI and VII of the Charter ... Chapters VI and VII of the
 Charter 
provided means for the prevention and punishment of genocide, means far more conc
rete and 
effective than anything possible in the sphere of international jurisdiction .. . The obligation 
to bring 
to the attention of the Security Council would ensure that States did not evade their oblig
ations. " 
(1948) UN Doc A/C.6/SR. 101. 
27 Matthew Lippman "The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the C
rime of 
Genocide: Forty-Five Years Later" (1994) 8 Temp ICLJ I, 67 paraphrasing Mr Morozov
 for the 
Soviet delegation. 
Article VIII, it simply articulates a right of states, through the United Nations, to 
invoke appropriate procedures for the prevention and suppression of genocide under 
the UN Charter, including Chapter VII action if necessary. In essence, this was also 
the aim of the Secretariat's Article XII. 
* * * 
Based on the above, the original duty to prevent imparted a right of intervention 
that, in light of the powers of Article VIII, arguably could not be objected to by a state 
invoking the protections of Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter28 - allowing 
recourse to organs of the UN to prevent genocide could not conceivably make 
genocide a matter essentially within a state's domestic jurisdiction. Thus, the 
Genocide Convention effectively defeats the argument made by Justice Jackson 
during the drafting of the Nuremberg Charter that were it not for Germany waging an 
aggressive and illegal war: 29 
... in which [America] became involved ... we [would] see no other basis on which 
we are justified in reaching the atrocities which were committed inside Germany, 
under German law, or even in violation of German law, by authorities of the 
German state. 
The Convention was designed to enable the international community to act 
unhindered by such concerns - but it does not appear that when finally adopted, the 
duty to prevent genocide entailed an obligation to intervene. Whether this remains the 
accepted approach can be analysed through subsequent practice and interpretation of 
the Convention. 
28 This analysis is convincingly presented by Hans-Heinrich Jescheck "Genocide" in Rudolph 
Bernhardt (ed) Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Vo! II , North-Holland Elsevier, 
Amsterdam, 1995) 541, 542. It is affirmed as a "useful observation" by William A Schabas 
Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2000) 452. 
29 "Minutes of Conference Session of 23 July 1945" in Report of Robert H Jackson, United States 
Representative to the International Coriference on Military Trials (US Government Printing Office, 
Washington , 1949) 333 . 
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B Interpreting the Duty to Prevent in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
I Obligations erga omnes 
In the Barcelona Traction
30 case, the ICJ commented that the outlawing of 
genocide was an obligation owed erga omnes - that is it is an obligation owed by all 
states to the international community as a whole, and is valid against all the world
, 
irrespective of the consent of states to be bound by it. Therefore, this makes it th
e 
concern of all states, and all "can be held to have a legal interest in their protection. "
31 
The legal basis for this reasoning was drawn from the Court's earlier advisory 
opinion on the question of reservations to the Genocide Convention. In that opinion
, 
the ICJ held that:
32 
... the principles underlying the Convention are principles which are recogni zed 
by 
civilized nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obligation. 
A 
second consequence [ of the conception that genocide is contrary to moral law a
nd 
to the spirit and aims of the United Nations] is the universal character both of t
he 
condemnation of genocide and of the co-operation required 'in order to libera
te 
mankind from such an odious scourge' (Preamble to the Convention). T
he 
Genocide Convention was therefore intended by the General Assembly and by t
he 
contracting parties to be definitely universal in scope. 
Essentially, the ICJ affirmed the customary international law status of the Genocid
e 
Convention, and as it was intended "to be definitely universal scope", it is beyon
d 
question that all states have a legal interest in protecting humanity from this odiou
s 
scourge. The Court then goes on to make some very interesting observations on th
e 
nature of this legal interest:
33 
The Convention was manifestly adopted for a purely humanitarian and civilizi
ng 
purpose. It is indeed difficult to imagine a convention that might have this du
al 
character to a greater degree, since its object on the one hand is to safeguard t
he 
very existence of certain human groups and on the other to confirm and endorse t
he 
most elementary principles of morality. In such a convention the contracting Stat
es 
do not have any interests of their own; they merely have, one and all, a commo
n 
interest, namely, the accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison 
d'etre of the convention. Consequently, in a convention of this type one cannot 
speak of individual advantages or disadvantages to States, or of the maintenance 
of 
a perfect contractual balance between rights and duties. The high ideals whi
ch 
inspired the Convention provide, by virtue of the common will of the parties, th
e 
foundation and measure of all its provisions. 
30 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Ltd (Belgium v Spain) [1970] !CJ Reports 3.
 
31 Barcelona Traction , above, 32 paras 33-34. 
32 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
 of Genocide 
(Advisory Opinion) [ 1951] !CJ Reports 15, 23. 
33 Reservations to the Genocide Convention, above, 23. 
The raison d'etre of the Convention is clearly prevention and punishment of the 
crime of genocide, as expressed in its title. If these "high purposes" are the common 
interest of the contracting states, and an obligation owed to the international 
community as a whole, then it may be possible to assert an obligation to intervene to 
"safeguard the very existence of certain human groups" where there is a clear 
outbreak of genocidal behaviour. To not intervene in a case where intervention would 
be the only effective means to halt the violence would seem to be a clear abrogation 
of this erga omnes obligation. If the Convention's "high ideals" provide the 
"foundation and measure" of its provisions, then surely the highest of these is 
eradicating the crime through prevention, and thus the measure of Article I's duty to 
prevent should be bolstered accordingly.34 
If the drafting history goes against these conclusions, then the rhetoric of the 
dissenting opinions are apt to answer this challenge. In his dissent, Judge Alvarez 
expressed the dangers of over reliance on the travaux preparatoires when dealing 
with conventions that, in a sense, form the "Constitution of international society, 
[and] the new international constitutional law."35 Such conventions: 36 
... must not be interpreted with reference to the preparatory work which preceded 
them; they are distinct from that work and have acquired a life of their own ; they 
can be compared to ships which leave the yards in which they have been built, and 
sail away independently, no longer attached to the dockyard . These conventions 
must be interpreted without regard to the past, and only with regard to the future . 
The other four judges delivering a joint dissenting opinion added to this sentiment 
noting that "the enormity of the crime of genocide can hardly be exaggerated, and any 
treaty for its repression deserves the most generous interpretation."37 
However, whatever the strengths of these arguments, recognition of them through 
state practice is still instrumental to establishing any such obligation. Under the law of 
treaties, "any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation" shall be considered.38 This exact 
concern was addressed in the case below against Yugoslavia. 
34 For further development of this argument see below, Part IV 8 The Impact of Erga Omnes 
Obligations on Humanitarian Intervention. 
35 Reservations to the Genocide Co11vention, above, 51 Alvarez J dissenting. 
36 Reservations to the Genocide Convention, above, 53 . 
37 Reservations to the Genocide Conve11tio11, above, 47 Guerrero, McNair, Read , and Mo JJ dissenting. 
38 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (22 May 1969) 1155 UNTS 331 , art 31 (3)(b). 
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2 1993 to 1996 proceedings in Bosnia and Herzegovina v Yugoslavia 
On 20 March 1993, Bosnia and Herzegovina (B-H) filed an application in the ICJ 
for provisional measures against the rump of Yugoslavia - Serbia and Montenegro -
alleging acts of genocide had been committed by former members of the Yugoslavia 
People's Army and by Serb military and paramilitary forces, assisted and directed by 
Yugoslavia. The allegations included the killing of Muslim inhabitants ofB-H and the 
torture, rape, kidnapping, wounding, starvation, and the physical and mental abuse 
and detention of the citizens of B-H.
39 Of interest for this paper was the allegation 
that Yugoslavia had breached its legal obligations towards the people and State of B-
H under Article I of the Genocide Convention.
40 
Three months after provisional measures were granted to B-H against 
Yugoslavia, B-H requested of the ICJ further measures charging:
41 
5. That all Contracting Parties to the Genocide Convention are obliged by Article 
I thereof 'to prevent' the commission of acts of genocide against the People 
and State of Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
7. That all Contracting Parties to the Genocide Convention have the obligation 
thereunder 'to prevent' acts of genocide, and partition and dismemberment by 
means of genocide, against the People and State of Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
9. That in order to fulfil their obligations under the Genocide Convention under 
the current circumstances, all Contracting Parties thereto must have the ability 
to provide military weapons, equipment, supplies and armed forces (soldiers, 
sailors, airpeople) to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina at its request. 
(emphasis added) 
Clearly, B-H interpreted the Genocide Convention to mean that outside intervention 
in order to prevent and halt genocide was entirely plausible and mandated by the 
Convention. The oft-cited separate opinion of Judge Elihu Lauterpacht in the 13 
September 1993 order directly explores the validity of this assertion. 
39 Facts as summarised by Matthew Lippman "Genocide: The Crime of the Century. The 
Jurisprudence of Death at the Dawn of the New Millennium" (2001) 23 Hous J lnt ' I L 467 , 511-512. 
40 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina v Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) ) Requests for the Indication of Provisional 
Measures (8 April 1993) [1993) !CJ Reports 16. 
41 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina v Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) ) Further Requests for the Indication of 
Provisional Measures (13 September 1993) [1993) !CJ Reports 325, 332-333. 
(a) Reasoning of Judge Lauterpacht 
Turning to the fifth request above, Judge Lauterpacht immediately rejected, on 
the basis of Article I, "[ a ]ny such narrow view" that would require the Genocide 
Convention to be interpreted as establishing "no more ... for the Contracting States 
[than] duties that are to be implemented by legislative action within their domestic 
legal spheres."42 In spite of his concession that "on the face of the Convention most 
of its provisions are taken up with aspects of the prevention and punishment of 
genocide within the national legal sphere" ( emphasis added), the undertaking to 
prevent and to punish genocide is, nevertheless, "comprehensive and unqualified. "43 
He further noted that the purpose of confirming in Article I that "genocide 'is a 
crime under international law' ... is to permit parties, within the domestic legislation 
that they adopt, to assume universal jurisdiction over the crime", meaning therefore 
that "a breach of duty can arise solely from failure to prevent or solely from failure to 
punish ... " genocide - a duty which, "on the plain meaning of the words of Article I", 
logically extends to "the inter-State level."44 Judge Lauterpacht also places much 
weight on the wording of Article IX of the Convention to infer that "the obligation 'to 
prevent' genocide extends also to the obligation to prevent a State from committing 
.d ,,45 genoc1 e. The relevant reference in Article IX is to the inclusion of disputes 
"relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide" amongst the competent subject-
matter jurisdiction of the ICJ. 
Thus, it is clearly contemplated that one State can charge genocide against 
another, and that it is not just the State in which the acts are being committed that has 
the responsibility to prevent the commission or continuance of those acts. Judge 
Lauterpacht concludes that there is "no doubt or ambiguity on the face of the text and 
preliminary scrutiny of the travaux preparatoires" that might suggest anything other 
than "this plain meaning", thus creating "no difficulty in declaring that all the parties 
to the Genocide Convention are under a duty to prevent genocide ... [at least] m 
respect of [their] own conduct. .. outside [their] territory ... " (emphasis in original)46 
42 Application of the Genocide Convention (Further Requests), above, 443 paras 109-110 separate 
opinion of Lauterpacht J. 
43 Application of the Genocide Convention (Further Requests}, above, 442-443 paras I 09-110. 
44 Application of the Genocide Convention (Further Requests), above, 443 paras 110-111. 
45 Application of the Genocide Convention (Further Requests}, above, 443-444 para 111. 
46 Application of the Genocide Convention (Further Requests), above, 444 paras 112-113, I 15 . 
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What becomes more difficult is the suggestion that the application and duties of 
the Convention, while "obviously [not] absolutely territorial" for "that would be 
nonsense", extend to disinterested and personally unaffected third party states. This 
would cause the duty of prevention to "also mean that every party is under an 
obligation individually and actively to intervene to prevent genocide outside its 
territory when committed by or under the authority of some other party."
47 Put 
another way, he asks does the duty extend to "preventing genocide wherever it may 
occur", the responsibility of which resting with the international community?
48 The 
resonance of the undertaking in the Secretariat draft preamble "to prevent and to 
repress such acts wherever they may occur" is unmistakeable, though Judge 
Lauterpacht does not refer to this connection. 
To answer this, while Article I does not limit the duty of prevention "by reference 
to person or place so that, on its face, it could be said to require every party positively 
to prevent genocide wherever it occurs", nevertheless it still "becomes necessary to 
look at State practice.',4
9 Citing a 1985 report on the prevention and punishment of 
genocide,50 he noted that there have been a number of cases of genocide since the 
Second World War such as:
51 
[t)he Tutsi massacre of Hutu in Burundi in 1965 and 1972, the Paraguayan 
massacre of Ache Indians prior to 1974, the Khmer Rouge massacre in Kampuchea 
between 1975 and 1978 and the contemporary Iranian killings of Bahai's. 
Based on the limited reaction and response of the contracting parties concerning the 
above incidents, Judge Lauterpacht surmises that, far from being evidence of an 
acceptance of an obligation to intervene, it may indicate a contrary practice 
"suggesting the permissibility of inactivity."
52 Thus, with some reluctance due to 
being "sympathetic .. . in principle to the idea of an individual and collective 
responsibility of States for the prevention of genocide wherever it may occur", Judge 
Lauterpacht found himself unable, "in the absence of a full treatment of this subject 
47 Application of the Genocide Convention (Further Requests) , above, 444 paras 114-115. 
48 Application of the Genocide Convention (Further Requests), above, 444 para 113 . 
49 Application of the Genocide Convention (Further Requests) , above, 444 para 115. 
50 B Whitaker, Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrim ination and Protection of Minorities Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the 
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (2 July 1985) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6, 9-10 para 24 . 
51 Application of the Genocide Convention (Further Requests), above, 444-445 para 115, citing 
Whitaker Report , above. 
52 Application of the Genocide Convention (Further Requests) , above, 445 para 11 5. 
by both sides, to express a view on it at this stage ... [and therefore] unable to accede 
to the fifth request."53 
As this case continues before the ICJ, Judge Lauterpacht has still to traverse the 
merits of this critical issue. As Parts III and IV below establish, this issue has now 
become all the more complex today than it was nine years ago, prior to the genocide 
in Rwanda, when he then felt the evidence went against his moral inclinations toward 
articulating an obligation to intervene. He was correct to attach such high importance 
to state practice because if such practice can be shown to be exercised under a sense 
of binding legal obligation, then a principle of intervention in response to genocide 
will have begun to carve its way into customary international law. Yet if 
"permissibility of inactivity" remams, even in some small measure, then although 
great visionaries like Raphael Lemkin may have rejoiced in the belief fifty-five years 
ago that in "declaring genocide a crime under international law and by making it a 
problem of international concern, the right of intervention on behalf of minorities 
slated for destruction has been established",54 unfortunately in practice, the 
international community has actually done little more in all this time than to declare 
what it can do, rather than focus the question on just what it will or should do. 
(b) Developments of the 1996 proceedings 
While not directly picking up Judge Lauterpacht's discussion, the ICJ affirmed 
that as "the rights and obligations enshrined in the Convention are rights and 
obligations erga omnes ... the obligation each State thus has to prevent and to punish 
the crime of genocide is not territorially limited by the Convention."55 This is 
embellished by the rhetoric of Judge Weeramantry in his separate opinion claiming, 
"[w]e have reached the stage, today, at which the human rights of anyone, anywhere, 
are the concern of everyone, everywhere."56 However, in contrast, Judge Kreca's 
dissent took a contra view on the territorial application of the Convention:
57 
What is the status of the Genocide Convention? With respect to the obligation of 
53 Application of the Genocide Convention (Further Requests), above, 445 para 115 . 
54 Raphael Lemkin "Genocide as a Crime in International Law" (1947) 41 Am J Int ' l L 145 , 150. 
55 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina v Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) ) Preliminary Objections [ 1996] !CJ 
Reports 595, 616 para 31. 
56 Application of the Genocide Convention (Preliminary Objections), above, 647. 
57 Application of the Genocide Convention (Preliminary Objections) , above, 766 para I 02 Kreca J 
dissenting. 
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prevention of the crime of genocide, the Convention does not contain the principle 
of universal repression. It has firmly opted for the territorial principle of the 
obligation of prevention and 'the only action relating to crimes committed outside 
the territory of the Contracting Party is by organs of the United Nations within the 
scope of the general competence.' [ citing Nehemiah Robinson The Genocide 
Convention : Its Origin and Interpretation (New York, 1949) 13-14.] 
If the Genocide Convention did expressly articulate the principle of universal 
repression then the subject of this paper would largely be a moot point. However, the 
context of Judge Kreca's comments concerns the implementation or enforcement of 
the erga omnes norm prohibiting genocide. In fact, he is quick to point out the 
universal applicability of this norm in terms of its capacity to bind all subjects of 
international law without any conventional obligation.
58 As he recognises this is a 
norm establishing obligations "toward the international community as a whole"
59 he 
is quite correct in stating that crimes committed outside the territory of a concerned 
State fall within the realm of the general competence of organs of the United Nations 
for it is only the United Nations that has the unique mandate to act on behalf of the 
international community. Thus, while Judge Kreca's analysis would rule out 
unilateral intervention of a third party State in response to genocide, the suggestion· 
that the obligation of prevention, up to and including the use of force in appropriate 
circumstances, is incumbent upon the United Nations would seem to be left open. 
* * * 
On the basis of the foregoing, and in light of the basic principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations concerning non-intervention, the following sections of this paper 
will proceed on the premise that it is the United Nations, in its capacity as the 
international community's representative, that logically must bear the obligation and 
duty to prevent genocide in situations where the state or states in which the acts occur 
have failed to adequately prevent or suppress them alone, and therefore necessitating 
international intervention. The duty to prevent for an individual state would then 
require support for preventative measures taken by the United Nations, as envisioned 
by Article XII of the Secretariat draft, and pledged in the preamble of the Convention 
by recognising that "international co-operation is required." Thus, a state should not 
actively work towards the effective obstruction of any United Nations intervention. 
58 Application of the Genocide Convention (Preliminary Objections) , above, 765 para IOI. 
59 Application of the Genocide Convention (Preliminary Objections), above, 765 para IOI. 
III POLITICAL v LEGAL FAILINGS DURING THE 1994 RWANDAN 
GENOCIDE 
In the 1999 Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United 
Nations during the genocide, clear acknowledgement of the catastrophic failings of 
the organisation to take preventative action was immediately offered:60 
The failure by the United Nations to prevent, and subsequently, to stop the 
genocide in Rwanda was a failure by the United Nations system as a whole ... There 
was a persistent lack of political will by Member States to act, or to act with 
enough assertiveness. 
What is clear from the report is that the greater political rather than legal failings 
primarily hampered any effective response to the genocide. It specifically noted 
that: 61 
[t]he lack of will to act in response to the crisis in Rwanda becomes all the more 
deplorable in light of the reluctance by key members of the International 
Community to acknowledge that the mass murder being pursued in front of global 
media was a genocide. The fact that what was occurring in Rwanda was a genocide 
brought with it a key international obligation to act in order to stop the killing. The 
parties to the 1948 Genocide Convention took upon themselves a responsibility to 
prevent and punish the crime of genocide. This is not a responsibility to be taken 
lightly. Although the main action required of the parties to the Convention is to 
enact national legislation to provide for jurisdiction against genocide, the 
Convention also explicitly opens the opportunity of bringing a situation to the 
Security Council. Arguably, in this context, the members of the Security Council 
have a particular responsibility, morally if not explicitly under the Convention, to 
react against a situation of genocide. (emphasis added) 
While deplorable, this extreme reluctance on behalf of Security Council members 
to charge genocide has deeper implications for the questions raised in this paper. At 
the heart of it are the reasons why there was such reluctance, and what Member States 
perceived their obligations under the Convention to be at the time. 
A The Somalia Factor and PDD-25 
The murders of UNOSOM II62 personnel, followed by the disastrous campaign 
carried out by United States Rangers and the Quick Reaction Force in Mogadishu one 
year prior to the Rwandan genocide, had deep and far reaching effects on the rationale 
60 Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide 
in Rwanda (15 December 1999) Un Doc S/1999/1257, 3 <http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/rwanda 
.htm> (last accessed I October 2002). 
61 Independent Inquiry, above, 38 Part Ill 5 b Failure to Respond to the Genocide. 
62 United Nations Operation in Somalia 11. 
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for, and conduct of, peacekeeping operations. The report of the Commission of 
Inquiry into the events that took place in Somalia concluded that "the UN should 
refrain from undertaking further peace enforcement actions within the internal 
conflicts of States."63 As the situation in Rwanda was clearly a fully fledged internal 
conflict, and this report was released at a time when the Security Council was 
deliberating over strengthening the UN AMIR 
64 mandate, this finding is crucial to 
understanding the actions and state of mind of members of the Security Council 
during the genocidal period. No-one on the Council wanted to see a repeat of 
Somalia, and as this conflict was viewed in terms of a civil war, albeit one of savage 
proportions, neither peacekeeping nor military intervention was appropriate in such 
circumstances - it was "totally impractical" - Somalia had at least taught the United 
Nations that.65 
Adding to this, after a year-long comprehensive review of US policy following 
the Somalia crisis, President Clinton moved to heavily restrict United States 
involvement in peacekeeping operations by signing and implementing the PresidentiaJ 
Decision Directive on Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD-25) on 3 May 1994. 
Future involvement with the UN would henceforth depend on strict criteria 
including: 66 
.. . whether or not US interests were at stake, whether or not there was a threat to 
world peace, a clear mission goal, acceptable costs, congressional, public and allied 
support, a working ceasefire, a clean command and control and a clear exit point. 
Aside from international aggression, a threat or breach of the peace must reach the 
level of an "[ u ]rgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence" or a "[ s ]udden 
interruption of established democracy or gross violation of human rights coupled with 
violence, or threat of violence." Further, support for Chapter VI or VII action will be 
considered if "[t]he political, economic and humanitarian consequences of inaction by 
the international community have been weighed and are considered unacceptable."
67 
63 Report of the Commission of Inquiry Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution
 885 
(1993) to Investigate Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II Personnel Which Led to Casualties Am
ong 
Them (1 June 1994) UN Doc S/1994/653 cited in Independent Inquiry, above , 41 Part Ill 7 
The 
Shadow of Soma I ia. 
64 United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda. 
65 Linda Melvem A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda 's Genocide (Zed Books 
Ltd, 
London, 2000) 1 72. 
66 As summarised by Melvern , above, 191. See also Presidential Decision Directive 25 on Re
forming 
Multilateral Peace Operations (3 May 1994) <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm
> (last 
accessed 5 October 2002). 
67 PDD-25 , above, Part I i Voting for Peace Operations. 
As the first UN operation to come up against PDD-25, the only criterion Rwanda 
could meet was the rationale that there was a threat to international peace and security 
based on the violent humanitarian crisis.68 Such a threat to peace and security was 
declared by the Security Council on 17 May 1994 in Resolution 918, warranting the 
imposition of an arms embargo under Chapter VII of the Charter.69 Yet, PDD-25 
clearly stipulates that no single factor is decisive in making the determination to 
commit United States forces to a peacekeeping operation:70 
[They] are an aid in decision-making; they do not by themselves constitute a 
prescriptive device .. . and [ decisions] will be based on the cumulative weight of the 
factors , with no single factor necessarily being an absolute determinant. 
While this may be construed as a legal failing directly contributing to the obstruction 
of any United Nations intervention to halt the genocide, it is more correct to blame its 
use as a political tool. PDD-25 was not created to obstruct intervention in Rwanda as 
it pre-existed the genocide, but once released it allowed the United States to replace 
its clear reluctance on a policy level to commit its troops to another Somalia by 
cloaking it with what is often called "the austerity of tabulated legalism."71 Madeline 
Albright demonstrated this by immediately opposing Boutros-Ghali's 13 May 
Security Council report recommending UNAMIR's forces be bolstered to 5,500 to 
protect civilians and provide security for humanitarian operations. She was now 
championing PDD-25 in accordance with which: 72 
. . . her staff said the plan for Rwanda was inadequate and lacking in field 
assessments. There must be more detailed preparations, a clearer concept of 
operations, a breakdown in the costs, and an idea of the duration of any mandate. 
As mentioned above, if"[ t]he political, economic and humanitarian consequences 
of inaction by the international community have been weighed and are considered 
unacceptable", as was clearly the position of mostly the non-permanent members of 
the Council regarding Rwanda, then this would be a strong factor under PDD-25 to 
support a UN operation. The cumulative weight of this along with the threat to peace 
and security based on "an urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence ... or 
68 Mel vem, above, 191. 
69 Security Council Resolution 918 (17 Ma y 1994) UN Doc S/Res/9 18, 4 para 13 < http://www.un.org/ 
Docs/scres/1994/scres94.htm> (last accessed I October 2002). 
70 PDD-25 , above, Part I i Voting for Peace Operations. 
7 1 These are the much celebrated words of Lord Wilberforce when referring to the tendency to adopt 
an overly strict or mechanical interpretation of an international convention when they instead , 
particularly those dealing with human rights, call for a generous and purposive interpretation. See 
Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher [ 1980] AC 3 19, 328 (PC). 
72 Melvem, above, 195. 
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gross violation of human rights coupled with violence", would have been the m
ore 
purposive approach, and arguably enough to satisfy its requirements. In referring
 to 
the blame heaped on PDD-25 for placing too many constraints on multilateral mili
tary 
action in Rwanda, David Scheffer, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues 
and 
former staff drafter of PDD-25, commented that:
73 
PDD-25 is not a straightjacket to deny justifiable interventions or preventi
ve 
measures when the lives of thousands of innocent civilians are at stake. It is, a
nd 
should continue to be, applied realistically, in light of the circumstances th
at 
confront the international community and the besieged civilian population at t
he 
time. 
While appreciating that in the post-Rwanda environment everyone 1s "all the 
more sensitive to humanitarian crises and the extent to which they may affect 
the 
interests of the United States and of the international community",
74 his analysis 
reiterates the argument that the problem of intervention during the height of
 the 
Rwandan crisis lay in the political rather than the legal arena. This reality 
was 
apparent to Dr Gregory Stanton, President of Genocide Watch, who decried a
t a 
recent conference: "Ultimately the failure to prevent the Rwandan genocide wa
s a 
political failure. Those with power failed to protect the powerless."
75 Without any 
political will to act by important Member States, and with no apparent appreciat
ion 
for any legal obligation to do so, the United Nations was effectively estopped fr
om 
carrying out, or even convincingly asserting, an obligation to intervene in respons
e to 
genocide. It is at this point where international law fails to protect civilians at risk. 
B "Acts of Genocide" but not Genocide 
On 8 June 1994 in Resolution 925, the Security Council finally acknowledged 
"the reports indicating that acts of genocide have occurred in Rwanda" and reca
lled 
that "in this context. .. genocide constitutes a crime punishable under internatio
nal 
73 David J Scheffer, US Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues (Speech to the Con
ference on 
Atrocities Prevention and Response, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
, 29 October 1999) 
reproduced in US Department of State International Information Programs "Text: 
Lessons learned in 
Rwanda Genocide Must Be Implemented" <http://usinfo.state.gov/products/p
dg/pdg.htm> (last 
accessed 23 August 2002) . 
74 Scheffer, above. 
75 Gregory H Stanton, President of Genocide Watch "Could the Rwandan Gen
ocide Have Been 
Prevented?" (Paper presented to "Generations of Genocide" Conference, London
, 27 January 2002) 
<http: //vvww.genocidewatch.org/rwandangenocideprevention.htm> (last accessed
 I O October 2002). 
law."76 Prefacing genocide with the words "acts of' had become the common lingo 
employed when broaching the subject of genocide - this time it was China that 
insisted on the preface, objecting to the use of genocide on its own in the resolution, 
but it was the United States that had previously been its most ardent follower. 
While still a welcome development, it had taken two full months of carnage in 
order to produce this acknowledgement. As noted by the Independent Inquiry:
77 
The delay in identifying the events in Rwanda as a genocide was a failure by the 
Security Council. The reluctance by some States to use the term genocide was 
motivated by a Jack of political will to act, which is deplorable. If there is ever to be 
effective international action against genocide, States must be prepared to identify 
situations as such, and to assume the responsibility to act that accompanies that 
definition. (emphasis in original) 
Of importance is the recognition that the delay came not from assessing the situation 
in Rwanda to have amounted to something other than genocide, but rather from a 
belief that in conceding genocide States would also be conceding that something had 
to be done to prevent or stop it. In relation to America's role in the delay, William 
Schabas believed it "reasonable to deduce that American hesitation at the time was in 
some way connected with a perception that there was indeed an obligation [to act] 
under the Convention."78 
While America was not the only state to shy away from declaring genocide, 
indeed Britain claimed such a declaration would make the Security Council "a 
laughing stock" if it failed to act on it,79 it was the semantics of the United States that 
attracted the most attention. What immediately comes to mind are the famous words 
of Shakespeare's Juliet: 
Tis but thy name that is my enemy; 
What's in a name? that which we call a rose 
By any other name would smell as sweet .... 
[Romeo and Juliet, Act II Scene 2] 
76 Security Council Resolution 925 (8 June I 994) UN Doc S/Res/925, 1 <http: //www.un.org/Docs/ 
scres/ 1994/scres94.htm> (last accessed 1 October 2002). 
77 Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide 
in Rwanda (15 December 1999) Un Doc S/1999/1257, 38 Part !II 5 b Failure to Respond to the 
Genocide. 
78 WiJJiam A Schabas "Problems of International Codification - Were the Atrocities in Cambodia and 
Kosovo Genocide?" (2001) New Eng L Rev 287,302. 
79 Sir David Hannay, British Ambassador to the UN (28 April 1994) cited in Linda Melvern 
"Genocide Behind the Thin Blue Line" ( 1997) 28(3) Security Dialogue 333, 341. 
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Just as Romeo would still have been the man Juliet loved had he any other name but 
Montague, by the same token, failing to acknowledge what was taking place was 
genocide did not in reality make it anything other than genocide. However, it seems 
that for those who did not want the United States to get embroiled in another internal 
conflict it was felt that recognising "these crimes by their rightful name"
80 would 
weaken their argument that nothing should be done. 
81 
1 April to June 1994: to charge or not to charge genocide? 
One of the earliest charges of genocide came from the Representative of the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) to the United Nations in a letter to Colin Keating, the 
President of the Security Council, on 13 April 1994 
82 
- 1 week after the killing began. 
Shortly after that, on 19 April, Human Rights Watch underestimated the number of 
dead at 100,000 and then called for use of the term 'genocide'.
83 On 29 April, Colin 
Keating proposed a presidential statement recognising it was genocide, and the Czech 
Republic Representative, Karel Kovanda, indignantly declared genocide and scoffed 
at the Security Council's focus on obtaining a ceasefire which "was rather like 
wanting Hitler to reach a ceasefire with the Jews."
84 Then, on 4 May, the Secretary-
General himself proclaimed in an interview with the US news programme Nightline 
that "[h]ere you have a real genocide, in Kigali."
85 By 9 May a US Defense 
Intelligence Agency report confirmed that an "organized parallel effort of genocide 
[was] being implemented by the army to destroy the leadership of the Tutsi 
community." (emphasis in original)8
6 
After one month, no effective action had been taken to attempt to halt the killing. 
All the Security Council could muster was a declaration echoing the terms of Articles 
80 See quote at the head of this paper by Bill Clinton cited at Footnote 2. 
81 Interview with Tony Marley, Political Military Advisor for the US State Department 
1992-95 
(Frontline, "The Triumph of Evil", 26 January 1999) <http ://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ f
rontlinc/ 
shows/evil/ interviews/marlev.html> (last accessed 28 August 2002) . 
82 Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Geno
cide 
in Rwanda (15 December 1999) Un Doc S/1999/1257, 68 Annex I - Chronology of Events. 
83 Samantha Power "Bystanders to Genocide: Why the United States Let the Rwandan 
Tragedy 
Happen" (September 2001) The Atlantic Monthly Boston, 84-108 Part YI I Genocide? W
hat 
Genocide? <http://www.theatl antic.com/issucs/200 l/09/power.htm> (last accessed 5 Octobe
r 2002). 
84 Linda Melvem A People Betrayed: Tlze Role of the West in Rwanda 's Genocide (Zed Books
 Ltd , 
London, 2000) 179. 
85 Independent Inquiry, above, 70 Annex I - Chronology of Events. 
86 Power, above, Part VII Genocide? What Genocide? 
I and II of the Genocide Convention (without actually declaring 'genocide') m its 
Presidential Statement of 30 April: 87 
[T]he Security Council recalls that the k,illing of members of an ethnic group with 
the intention of destroying such a group in whole or in part constitutes a crime 
punishable by international Jaw. 
A 1999 report of the French National Assembly described this circumventing of the 
Convention's definition of genocide to avoid using the term as "l'hypocrisie la plus 
totale."88 
In light of this, United States policy becomes important. Samantha Power notes a 
discussion paper on Rwanda, dated 1 May, and prepared by the Office of the 
Secretary of Defence, which clearly expresses official concems:
89 
I. Genocide Investigation: Language that calls for an international investigation of 
human rights abuses and possible violations of the genocide convention. Be 
Careful. legal at State was worried about this yesterday - Genocide finding could 
commit [the U.S. government} to actually 'do something'. [ emphasis added by 
reporter] 
Assuming this is correct, it adds meaning to the statements made by State Department 
Spokesperson, Christine Shelly, when responding to a question over why the 
terminology "acts of genocide" was adopted by the United States to refer to the 
situation in Rwanda. She justified it on the basis that "there are obligations which 
arise in connection with the use of the term [genocide]." ( emphasis added)9° As Ms 
Shelly referred to the Genocide Convention and its meaning several times in the 
briefing, and in an earlier briefing had noted "the use of the term 'genocide' has a 
very precise legal meaning although it's not strictly a legal determination",
91 the 
context of her statement appears to suggest she is talking about legal obligations 
arising from any determination of genocide. 
87 "Statement by the President of the Security Council Condemning the Slaughter of Civilians m 
Kigali and Other Parts of Rwanda" (30 April 1994) UN Doc S/PRST/1994/21 , 
<http://wvrw.un.org/Docs/ sc/statements/1994/sprst94.htm> (last accessed I O October 2002). 
88 Cited in William A Schabas Genocide in International law: The Crime of Crimes (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2000) 460. 
89 Power, above, Part Vil Genocide? What Genocide? 
9° Christine Shelly, US State Department Spokesperson ( I O June 1994) Daily Press Briefing No 89 
<http: //dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/bricfing/daily briefings/ 1994/9406/94061 Odb.html> (last accessed 9 
October 2002). 
91 Christine Shelly, US State Department Spokesperson (28 April 1994) Daily Press Briefing No 68 
<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/bricfing/daily briefings/ I 994/9404/940428db.html> (last accessed 9 
October 2002). 
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It seems obvious from the outside that "[a]n act of genocide is genocide, just as 
an act of rape is rape, or an act of murder, murder."
92 Yet, when asked "[ w ]hat's the 
difference between 'acts of genocide' and 'genocide'?", Ms Shelly responded:
93 
As you know, there is a legal definition of this. There has been a lot of discussion 
about how the definition applies under the definition of 'genocide' contained in the 
1948 convention. If you're looking at that for your determination about genocide, 
clearly, not all of the killings that have taken place in Rwanda are killings to which 
you might apply that label. 
If these clear non-genocidal killings to which she is referring mean those of the RPF 
as they advanced on the rebel Hutu Government, then she is correct in not attributing 
genocide to them. However, just how this is meant to distinguish between "acts of 
genocide" and "genocide" is very unclear. There is nothing in the Genocide 
Convention to suggest that all the killings undertaken in a given conflict must be of a 
genocidal nature to constitute genocide overall. Moreover, Article VIII of the 
Convention expressly applies to action "for the prevention and suppression of acts of 
genocide", and Article II defines genocide as "any of the following acts ... " ( emphasis 
added), which would seem to make Shelly's (and the United States') whole line of 
argument and reasoning completely redundant. 
Dissatisfaction with her explanations was also apparent in the retort offered by 
her questioner Alan Elsner: "How many acts of genocide does it take to make 
genocide?" To which she replied, "that's just not a question that I'm in a position to 
answer", but yet when asked to define an 'act of genocide' she directly recited the 
definition of genocide in the Convention which Elsner held her to account for.
94 
Appreciating this false distinction, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, that same 
day, finally reneged and said: "If there's any particular magic in calling it genocide, I 
have no hesitancy in saying that."
95 
2 Necessary implications 
It is difficult to come to any other conclusion, based on the above, that under all 
the diplomatic bravado, and after the first round of reports had been considered, that 
92 Gregory H Stanton, President of Genocide Watch "Could the Rwandan Genocide Have Been 
Prevented?" (Paper presented to "Generations of Genocide" Conference, London , 27 January 2002). 
93 Daily Press Briefing No 89, above. 
94 Daily Press Briefing No 89, above. 
95 Philip Gourevitch We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We will be Killed with Our Families 
(Farrar Straus and Giroux, New York, 1998) 153 . 
by 10 June America could have properly considered the situation to be anything other 
than simple genocide. Schabas' assertion that this pointed to a perception that there 
was an obligation to act under the Convention is indeed "reasonable to deduce."96 
Thus, the comfort in which States allowed for a climate "suggesting the 
permissibility of inactivity", as Judge Lauterpacht found in September 1993 had now, 
following Somalia and Rwanda, seemed to have transformed into a sense of disquiet 
in the international community over inactivity in the face of genocide. The response 
from America, and hence the Security Council, was to not acknowledge genocide in 
the hope of avoiding accusations of acquiescence and inaction. When no official 
position on genocide was proffered in the first two months, no action was taken - yet 
when it was finally declared on 8 June, within two weeks the Security Council had 
authorised French military intervention under a Chapter VII mandate.97 There is a 
strong argument to suggest that the latter was the necessary consequence of the 
former, something Boutros-Ghali appreciated commenting on Nightline that "because 
it is a question of genocide ... I am sure that we have the capacity to intervene."98 The 
reality that the United Nations did act, even if was too little too late, seems to indicate 
a tentative acceptance by that time that it would have been unconscionable, whether 
legally, politically or morally, not to do so once genocide was confirmed. 
96 See above Part Ill 8 "Acts of Genocide" not Genocide. 
97 See Security Council Resolution 929 (22 June 1994) UN Doc S/ Res/929, 2 para 3. The resolution 
authorised under Chapter VII the use of "all necessary means to achieve the humanitarian 
objectives." <http: //www.un.org/Docs/ scres/l 994/scres94.htm> (last accessed 1 October 2002). 
98 Cited by Linda Melvern A People Betrayed: The Role of the West i11 Rwanda's Genocide (Zed 
Books Ltd, London, 2000) 190. 
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IV POST-RWANDA: MOVING TOWARDS A NEW LAW AND POLITIC
S 
OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN RESPONSE TO GENOCIDE 
After the Rwandan genocide, United States officials - most likely somewhat 
embarrassed over the whole affair - began to re-examine the nature of the obligatio
n 
to prevent genocide, and whether this imposed a duty on parties to the Genocid
e 
Convention to intervene militarily in order to halt the violence. In 1998 Davi
d 
Scheffer presented his views to a Washington conference on genocide prevention:
99 
There needs to be a better understanding of Article II [sic] of the Gen
ocide 
Convention. Under Article II [sic] , states parties confirm that genocide, wh
ether 
committed in time of peace or war, is a crime under international law that
 they 
undertake to prevent and punish. The U.S. Senate, in ratifying the Gen
ocide 
Convention, understood this to express the general purpose and intent of s
tates 
parties, without adding any independent or specific obligation to the Gen
ocide 
Convention. A state party may choose from among a range of measures: diplom
atic 
pressure, economic sanctions, judicial initiatives, or the use of military for
ce to 
' undertake' to prevent or punish genocide. But the state party's choic
e is 
necessarily discretionary. No government should be intimidated into doing no
thing 
by the requirements of Article !I [sic]; rather, every government should view
 it as 
an opportunity to react responsibly if and as genocide occurs. 
In spite of the implications of America's delay in admitting genocide in Rwanda, th
e 
sentiment above is not new and found resonance at the time in a response from
 
Christine Shelly to a question on whether the United States Government is required t
o 
stop a genocide once declared: 
100 
[M]y understanding of the issue is whereas there is not an absolute requiremen
t ifa 
determination on genocide is made to intervene directly in the particular 
crisis 
under international law - and particularly under the 1948 Genocide Convent
ion -
there are several ways which are outlined ... in that for proceeding u
nder 
international law to investigate and ultimately take actions related to the crim
e of 
genocide. 
Yet, a niggling feeling remains that these comments are somewhat out of vogue 
in contemporary thinking on the subject of genocide. Aside from Rwanda, atrocitie
s 
committed against civilians in the last decade in other regions such as Iraq, Bosnia
, 
Somalia, Kosovo, and East Timor, though not all reaching the level of genocide, have
, 
in the very least, bolstered the justifications for the doctrine of humanitaria
n 
intervention. It has resulted in a proliferation of the oft-cited mantra from th
e 
99 David J Scheffer, US Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues (Speech to th
e Conference on 
"Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity: Early Warning and Prevention", Un
ited States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum, 10 December 1998) reproduced in US Department o
f State International 
Information Programs "Responding to Genocide and Crimes Against Humanit
y" <http ://usinfo.statc 
.gov/products/pdq/pdq.htm> (last accessed 23 August 2002). 
10° Christine Shelly, US State Department Spokesperson (28 April 1994) Daily Press Briefing No 68. 
Holocaust "never again", arguably leading to the creation of "a rejuvenated Security 
Council that now considers abuses of human rights within the borders of sovereign 
states to be matters that concern international peace and security and that compel its 
intervention." 101 While such abuses would need to be of an egregious nature to 
support this assertion, the point is the tide seems to be turning in favour of prevention 
rather than punishment alone, particularly when dealing with cases of genocide. 
A Resolving Hesitations with the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention 
In the Corfu Channel 102 case, the United Kingdom argued for a "new and special 
application of the theory of intervention" that would allow for the intervening state to 
"secure possession of evidence in the territory of another State, in order to submit to 
an international tribunal and thus facilitate its task." 103 However, the ICJ was unable 
to accept this line of argument on the basis that it could only regard it as "the 
manifestation of a policy of force", which in the past has "given rise to most serious 
abuses, and . .. cannot, whatever be the present defects in international organisation, 
find a place in international law." 104 
The general and well accepted prohibition on external intervention was then more 
clearly pronounced by Judge Alvarez: 105 
The intervention of a State in the internal or external affairs of another - i.e., action 
taken by a State with a view to compelling another State to do, or to refrain from 
doing, certain things - has long been condemned. It is expressl y forbidden by the 
Charter of the United Nations . The same applies to other acts of force, and even to 
a threat of force . 
. .. The Court must reaffirm , as often as the occasion arises, that intervention and all 
other kinds of forceable action are not permissible, in any form or on any pretext, in 
relations between States; but the Court may excuse such acts in exceptional 
circumstances. 
Exactly what the "exceptional circumstances" might be Judge Alvarez does not 
elaborate on, but as this case was decided in 1949 it would be a leap of faith to 
conclude he may have been referring to intervention for humanitarian purposes. 
10 1 William A Schabas "Sentencing by International Tribunals : A Human Rights Approach" ( 1997) 7 
Duke J Comp & lnt'l L 461 , 515 . 
102 Corfu Channel (UK v Albania) Merits [ 1949] !CJ Reports 4. 
103 Corfu Channel, above, 34. 
104 Corfu Channel, above, 35 . 
105 Corfu Channel, above, 47 individual opinion of Alvarez J. 
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The principle of non-intervention has also on numerous occasions been affirmed 
by the General Assembly. In Resolution 2625(:XXV) of 1970, it declared: 
106 
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any 
reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, 
armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against 
the personality of the State or against its political , economic and cultural elements, 
are in violation of international law. 
However, the common proviso that follows such enunciations preserves the inherent 
right of the United Nations for collective intervention, maintaining that nothing in 
these principles "shall be construed as affecting the relevant provisions of the Charter 
relating to the maintenance of international peace and security."
107 Genocide, as ajus 
cogens crime, an erga omnes obligation, a recognised threat to international peace and 
security, and an egregious violation of human rights that cannot be within the internal 
or external affairs of the offending state, necessarily infers that intervention in order 
to prevent or halt it must therefore fall outside this general prohibition. In that regard, 
Judge Alvarez's assertion "that intervention and all other kinds of forceable action are 
not permissible, in any form or on any pretext, in relations between States" ( emphasis 
added) is pitched too high, even in spite of his qualification that "the Court may 
excuse such acts in exceptional circumstances", because it is submitted that no excuse 
need be made when reacting to genocide - short of commanding a proportionate 
response. 
Thus, it is not difficult to support a rationale of justified humanitarian 
intervention in response to genocide in light of these factors, and also the relevant 
provisions of the United Nations Charter that require the organisation to promote 
respect for and observance of fundamental human rights. 
108 However, a 1986 British 
Foreign Office Policy Document illustrates that relative discomfort still surrounded 
the doctrine prior to the end of the Cold War. While conceding that a "substantial 
body of opinion and of practice" exists to support the rationale that when violations of 
106 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations (24 October 1970) GA Res 
2625 (XXV). For similar statements of this principle, see also Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and 
Sovereignty (21 December 1965) GA Res 2131 (XX); Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States (9 December 1981) GA Res 36/ I 03 , 
para ll(a) <http: //www.un .org/documents/ga/res /36/a36r I 03 .htm> (last accessed I O October 2002) . 
107 GA Res 2625 (XXV), above. See also GA Res 36/103, above, para 6 "Nothing in this Declaration 
shall prejudice action taken by the United Nations under Chapters VJ and VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations." 
108 Charter of the United Nations (26 June 1945) 59 Stat 1031 , arts 1(3) and 55(c). 
body of opinion and of practice" exists to support the rationale that when violations of 
human rights occur "that shock the conscience of mankind, intervention in the interest 
of humanity is legally permissible", it nonetheless determined that such state practice 
"provides an uncertain basis" for the doctrine, particularly when "history has shown 
that humanitarian ends are almost always mixed with other less laudable motives for 
intervening." 109 This appeared to be the case with Operation Turquoise, the French 
intervention in Rwanda, which has often been accused of being more of a political, as 
opposed to humanitarian, exercise. 110 The policy document concludes that there are 
three reasons that militate against a right, and hence a duty, of humanitarian 
intervention: the UN Charter and modem international law do not specifically 
incorporate it; state practice, especially since 1945, only presents at best a handful of 
genuine cases; and the scope for abuse of the doctrine weighs strongly against its 
creation, and therefore "its doubtful benefits would be heavily outweighed by its costs 
in terms of respect for international law." 111 
However, the plethora of internal conflicts in the 1990s became the catalysts for a 
re-evaluation of such critiques, and if an obligation to act exists, the interventions in 
these conflicts have been incremental in its establishment. 
1 The Iraqi precedent 
Following the defeat of the Iraqi army occupying Kuwait, civilian rebellions 
against Saddam Hussein's rule took place in Northern and Southern Iraq, only to be 
ferociously put down by the still strong Iraqi army. This created a flood of well over 
one million Kurdish refugees to the Turkish and Iranian borders, many of them 
perishing in their flight. In the very least, the actions of the Iraqi forces constituted 
egregious violations of human rights, and at worst, war crimes and/or grave breaches 
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and crimes against humanity. 
Resolution 688 (1991) was adopted by the Security Council to address "the 
magnitude of human suffering" caused by such acts "which threaten international 
109 United Kingdom Foreign Office Pol icy Document No 148 ( 1986) 57 BY 1 L 614 , para I I (20) . 
11 0 Linda Melvern A People Betrayed: Th e Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide (Zed Books Ltd , 
London , 2000) 210. 
111 Foreign Office Policy Document, above, para JI (22). 
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to all humanitarian organizations to contribute to ... humanitarian relief efforts" a
s 
required by the Secretary-General.
113 Of importance is the fact these requests were 
not made under the Chapter VII mandate that had previously been invoked during th
e 
Gulf War, and so in theory, Resolution 688 was subject to the Article 2(7) non
-
intervention principles of the Charter. Thus, the subsequent establishment of 'saf
e 
havens' to provide protection and humanitarian assistance for the Kurdish population
s 
inside Northern Iraq by American, British, and French land forces appeared to clas
h 
with these principles. 
What is interesting is the rapid change in the British position on humanitarian 
intervention from the Foreign Office Policy in 1986, to being prepared in 1992 "t
o 
recognise an evolution in the law concerning humanitarian intervention in a case suc
h 
as Iraq."114 In the course of questioning before the UK Foreign Affairs Committee
, 
Mr Aust, a Legal Counsellor for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, noted that a
s 
Resolution 688 recognised the existence of a severe human rights and humanitaria
n 
situation in Iraq, the United Kingdom, America, and France took action "in exerci~
e 
of the customary international law principle of humanitarian intervention. "
115 Here he 
claimed the "practice of states ... over a long period" had established this righ
t, 
whereas six years earlier "state practice in the past two centuries" ( emphasis added)
 
was seen to be "an uncertain basis on which to rest such a right" and "at best provide
s 
only a handful of genuine cases of humanitarian intervention."
116 The point to make 
here is that now there appears to be an acceptance of the validity of this state practice
, 
and while it is couched in terms of a customary right to intervention, it still represent
s 
a marked change in the attitude towards gross violations of human rights, and th
e 
emergence of feelings that the international community cannot stand idly by whe
n 
such situations arise. As noted by Mr Aust, if there is the will, then "international law
 
in this field develops to meet new situations."
117 
11 3 SC Res 688 (1991) , above, 32. 
114 David J Harris Cases and Materials on International Law (5'h ed, Sweet & Maxwell ,
 London 1998) 
920. 
11 5 Statements of Mr Aust, FCO Legal Counsellor "Memorandum to the Foreign Af
fairs Committee" 
(1992) reproduced in Harris, above, 921. 
11 6 Contrast Statements of Mr Aust, above, 921 with Foreign Office Policy Document
 No 148 ( 1986) 
57 BY!L 614, paras lI (21-22). 
11 7 Statements of Mr Aust, above, 921. 
2 The effect of Bosnia and Somalia 
Following Iraq, an emboldened, and somewhat empowered, Security Council 
took on greater responsibility for humanitarian crises. In contrast to the Iraqi situation, 
the interventions in Bosnia and Somalia were mandated under Chapter VII, and were 
clearly actions of the United Nations (in the sense of the creation of UN forces) rather 
than those of a particular state or group of states. 
Unlike Iraq, these conflicts (particularly Somalia) were civil wars which meant 
the Security Council's concern was directly focused on the humanitarian crisis within. 
In Resolution 770 (1992) the Council recognised that "the provision of humanitarian 
assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina is an important element in the Council's efforts 
to restore international peace and security."11 8 Resolution 794 (1992) also expressed 
similar sentiment: 119 
. . . the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further 
exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian 
assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security. 
In light of the zeal with which the Council approached the humanitarian issue, 
Schabas' observation, mentioned above, that the world is witnessing a "rejuvenated 
Security Council that now considers abuses of human rights within the borders of 
sovereign states to be matters ... that compel its intervention",120 is particularly 
appropriate here. It seems too dismissive to reason such practice away as a simple 
exercise of the international community's right of intervention in humanitarian 
disasters. It is more likely the resort to Chapter VII enforcement measures in these 
cases is undertaken under a sense of obligation, especially considering the Council's 
duty to safeguard international peace and security which it clearly states these 
situations threaten. 121 
It would therefore be more correct, though problematic, to speak of a right of 
humanitarian intervention only on behalf of individual states, but a responsibility and 
11 8 Security Council Resolution 770 ( 13 August 1992) U Doc S/ Res/770 <http ://www.un.org/docu 
ments/sc/rcs/l 992/scres92.htm> (last accessed l O October 2002). 
11 9 Security Council Resolution 794 (3 December 1992) UN Doc S/Res/794 <http://v1wwl.umn.edu/hu 
manrts/peace/docs/scres794.html> (last accessed l O October 2002). 
120 See above Part IV Post-Rwanda: Moving Towards a New Law and Politics of Humanitarian 
Intervention in Response to Genocide - Footnote 10 I. 
121 Charter of the United Nations (26 June 1945) 59 Stat 1031, art 24( I) expressly refers to the 
Council's "responsibility" and "duties" in the maintenance of international peace and security. 
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duty of the United Nations to mandate such intervention when dire human rights 
situations necessitate it. Clearly genocide is such a situation, and if talking in 
absolutes, it must be seen to have the most legitimate claim on the existence of such 
an obligation over all other fundamental human rights violations. The disaster of 
Somalia effectively diluted the political appetite for such intervention that had been 
fostered by Iraq and Bosnia, so when Rwanda finally exploded the failure to act could 
not have resulted from the lack of an obligation to intervene, but rather from an acute 
awareness that an acknowledgement of genocide would mean the international 
community would be compelled to do so. 
B The Impact of Erga Omnes Obligations on Humanitarian Intervention 
Building on the principles raised in the Barcelona Traction case and the 
aforementioned arguments concerning the impact of erga omnes obligations on the 
d 'd 122 uty to prevent genoc1 e, Professor Stephen Toope concludes that as "the 
prevention of genocide must fall within the definition of an erga omnes 
obligation ... this would give rise to an individual duty upon states to act in cases of 
apprehended genocide." ( emphasis in original) 
123 His basis for this argument is 
complex. He notes that the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case held that as erga 
omnes obligations are owed by a state towards the international community as a 
whole, this meant that all states have a legal interest in the protection of such rights.
124 
Professor Toope found it particularly interesting that the Court equated the terms 
"obligations" and "rights": 
125 
I see this confluence of concepts as intentional and important. The obligation owed 
erga omnes does not necessarily give rise to a corresponding duty to insist upon the 
enforcement of the obligation. However, if there is a right to expect the 
performance of erga omnes obligations, a right vested collectively in "the 
international community as a whole" (to quote the World Court), then an argument 
can be traced out that individual states are burdened with a duty under customary 
law to enforce the obligation, just as they have agreed to within the treaty regime of 
the Genocide Convention. (emphasis in original) 
122 See above Part II B I Obligations erga omnes. 
123 Stephen J Toope " Does International Law Impose a Duty Upon the United Nations to P
revent 
Genocide?" (2000) 46 McGill LJ 187, 193. 
124 Toope, above, 193; see also Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Ltd (Belgium v Spain) [ 1970
] 
!CJ Reports 3, 32 paras 33-34. 
125 Toope, above, 193. 
Thus, if states have the right to expect the performance of the obligation to 
prevent genocide, taking Professor Toope's argument one step further, then the 
United Nations, as the legitimate representative of all states, must be burdened with 
this duty under customary international law to perform the obligation. As this may 
require recourse to intervention, individual states - in order to ensure the enforcement 
of this erga omnes obligation - would then be required to support the actions of the 
United Nations in this sphere. This is why the prevention of genocide is "an erga 
omnes obligation par excellence"126 because states have a right to expect and ensure 
its enforcement. In such a case, humanitarian intervention in response to genocide 
would be beyond reproach. 
C Jus Cogens Issues: Genocide and the Unilateral Use of Force 
Even if states are so required to support United Nations action in response to 
genocide, to say that this would in practice stop a permanent member exercising their 
power of veto in the Security Council if it were fundamentally opposed to any such 
intervention is to be a little too idealistic considering the present state of world affairs. 
NATO's intervention in Kosovo in March 1999, and now America threatening to take 
its "war on terror" to Iraq (though not because of genocide) serve as pertinent 
reminders. 
This paper has argued the case for the existence of an obligation upon the United 
Nations to intervene, but if it is prevented from doing so does this mean that the duty 
to prevent genocide then demands unilateral intervention by an individual state or 
group of states? Arguments in favour of such a proposition are based on the 
acceptance that the prohibition of genocide is ajus cogens norm of such a peremptory 
and non-derogable nature that its prevention must also rise to that level. This means, 
under the law of treaties, that when "a new peremptory norm of general international 
law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and 
terminates." 127 As a treaty under Article 5 of the Vienna Convention,
128 the 
provisions in the Charter of the United Nations prohibiting the use of force other than 
in self defence, or when mandated by the Security Council, would appear to fall foul 
126 Toope, above, 193. 
127 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (22 May 1969) 1155 UNTS 331 , art 67. 
128 Vienna Convention, above, art 5 "The present Convention applies to any treaty which is the 
constituent instrument of an international organization ... " 
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of this rule to the extent they might prevent unilateral intervention in response t
o 
genocide in cases where the Security Council is estopped from intervening itself. 
This, coupled with the treaty based obligation on states parties to prevent 
genocide in Article I of the Genocide Convention, appears on first glance to b
e 
convincing. However, the key problem is that the prohibition on the use of force othe
r 
than in circumstances permitted under the Charter is also considered to be a ju
s 
cogens norm, and thus the merits of the argument immediately dissipate.
129 William 
Schabas, usually keenly supportive of an obligation to intervene, nevertheles
s 
expresses reservations with any such justifications for unilateral intervention: 
130 
Tolerating individual initiatives in the absence of Security Council permission 
is a 
slippery slope that threatens chaos. The consequences for international hum
an 
rights are potentially as serious as those of any genocide. 
1 The influence of Kosovo and America 's "war on terror" 
Aside from the illegality issue, the positive influence that NATO's intervention in 
Kosovo had on establishing an obligation to intervene in response to genocide is quit
e 
clear. The belief that genocide and persecution against the Kosovar minority ma
y 
have been taking place in the region was a driving force (aside from strategic an
d 
political motives) behind the use of force. In an interview, David Scheffer referred t
o 
"clear indications of genocide" - something NA TO leaders had also spoken of, an
d 
even Kofi Annan warned of "the dark cloud of the crime of genocide."
131 
Even though it later appeared that the situation did not actually rise to that level, 
and the Security Council was seen to be stalemated by the veto, it is the promp
t 
reaction and willingness to charge genocide, and then use that charge as the basis fo
r 
the use of force, that indicates states are well aware of the special legitimacy tha
t 
genocide brings to intervention. While not directly asserting the campaign wa
s 
undertaken because of an obligation to act in such circumstances, the rhetoric abov
e 
129 Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts Oppenheim 's International Law (9'h ed, vol 1, 
Longman, 
London , 1996) 7-8. 
130 William A Schabas Genocide in lntemational Law: The Crime of Crimes (Cambr
idge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2000) 502. 
13 1 Schabas, above, 499-500 citing Interview with David Scheffer, US Ambassado
r-at-Large for War 
Crimes Issues (CNN, 18 April 1999); John M Broder "In Address to the Nation, Cli
nton Explains 
Need to Take Action" (25 March 1999) New York Times ; "Statement by the 
United Nations 
Secretary-General to the Commission on Human Rights" (7 April 1999). 
at least demonstrates an awareness of an obligation not to look away and cast a blind 
eye to such atrocities. It also goes some way in removing the hesitations over 
intervention in internal conflicts that plagued the Rwandan genocide. In this regard, 
Alan Kuperman noted that United States policymakers now accepted that an 
exception to the rule that "U.S. ground troops generally should not be used in 
humanitarian interventions during ongoing civil wars ... should be made for cases of 
genocide." 132 
Further, following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, America's "war on 
terror" has been refocused on Iraq, threatening military intervention in order to force 
Saddam Hussein to disarm and destroy all "weapons of mass destruction" - otherwise 
America will see to their destruction itself. While the campaign is not concerned with 
genocide, the United States National Security Strategy states that America will "wage 
a war of ideas" to win the battle against terrorism which includes: 
133 
[U]sing the full influence of the United States, and working closely with allies and 
friends , to make clear that all acts of terrorism are illegitimate so that terrorism will 
be viewed in the same light as slavery, piracy, or genocide: behavior that 110 
respectable government can condone or support and all must oppose. (emphasis 
added) 
On any reading this sounds like promoting a policy of zero-tolerance for terrorism, 
just as there already exists, based on the wording of the Strategy, such a policy for the 
crime of genocide. A strong argument can be made that zero-tolerance according to 
America clearly means intervention whenever and wherever so required. The 
Strategy's opening remarks support such an approach declaring: 
134 
History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In 
the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of 
action. 
Curiously, these words have a close affinity with those of Kofi Annan's when 
questioned on the lack of political will and failure to act in Rwanda, he too said 
"Everyone involved will be harshly judged by history."
135 
132 Alan J Kuperman "Rwanda in Retrospect" (2000) 79(1) Foreign Affairs 94. 
133 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002) 6 < http: //www.whitc 
house.gov/nsc/nss.pdf> (last accessed 13 October 2002). 
134 National Security Strategy, above, Introduction. 
135 Interview with Kofi Annan (July 1994) cited in Linda Melvern A People Betrayed: The Role of the 
West in Rwanda's Genocide (Zed Books Ltd, London, 2000) 236. 
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2 Non-military countermeasures as a compromise to the use of force 
Under Chapter VII, Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, measures not 
involving the use of force, but constituting intervention nonetheless, are expressly 
provided for: 
These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of 
rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the 
severance of diplomatic relations. 
In the case of Rwanda, where clear and insidious direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide was communicated primarily via the radio station Radio-Television 
Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), the jamming of radio broadcasts would have gone 
a long way in stemming the tide of violence.
136 The RPF had called upon the Security 
Council to take such action, but the request was largely overlooked and ignored. 
137 
The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty concluded that the resort to military force should be one of "last resort" 
and thus all lesser forms of intervention should first be explored.
138 Based on this, the 
Security Council should have turned its mind to alternative means of intervention in 
Rwanda with much greater fervour - especially when political will to act militarily 
was so absent. An obligation to intervene would then become more closely aligned 
with the inherent connotations in the phrase "undertake to prevent" the crime of 
genocide, as jamming the airwaves, for example, would have just as much, if not 
more, preventative impact than it would for the purposes of suppression of violence. 
136 For a comprehensive review of the law on radio jamming see Jamie F Metzl "Rwandan Genocide 
and the International Law of Radio Jamming" (1997) 91 Am J Int'I L 628. 
137 Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide 
in Rwanda (15 December 1999) Un Doc S/1999/1257, 72 Annex l: Chronology of Events. 
138 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty The Responsibility to Protect 
(December 2001) paras 4.3-4.9 <http://www.iciss-ciisc.gc.ca/Rcport-English.asp#rights> (last 
accessed 13 October 2002). 
V CONCLUSIONS 
In essence, Alan Kuperman's assertion, and truism to a certain extent, that "[t]he 
most obvious lesson of Rwanda's tragedy is that intervention is no substitute for 
prevention", 139 should clearly be the primary ambition and goal of the duty to prevent 
genocide as established by the Genocide Convention. However, an equally clear 
lesson from Rwanda is that when prevention has failed and genocide has erupted, 
there can be no substitute for intervention, whatever form it takes. For the 
Convention's duty to prevent to have any substantive and effective meaning, states 
must be prepared to give it a purposive interpretation so that it is apt to answer the 
specific and unique challenges each individual situation inevitably brings. As Judge 
Alvarez concluded, conventions such as the Genocide Convention "must be 
interpreted without regard to the past, and only with regard to the future." 140 
Despite the shortcomings, there can be no doubt over the significant progress that 
has been made in the development of the law and politics surrounding humanitarian 
intervention. Perhaps the emergence of genocide as a special and particularly 
important case for intervention will also move states to strive for international 
consensus on the parameters of humanitarian intervention. Kofi Annan challenged the 
General Assembly in 2000 to do just this: 141 
... if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, 
how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica - to gross and systematic 
violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity? 
Thus, a conservative view of the duty to prevent that extends only to an individual 
state's sphere of interest may not have caused much concern at all prior to the 1990s, 
but the surge in violent internal conflicts, and the shocking occurrence of two 
genocides within the first five years of the last decade that were recognized threats to 
international peace and security, now seems to militate against such an interpretation. 
139 Alan J Kuperman "Rwanda in Retrospect" (2000) 79(1) Foreign Affairs 94, 117. 
140 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Advisory Opinion) [ 1951] ICJ Reports 15, 53 Alvarez J dissenting. See above Part I I 8 I 
Obligations Erga Omnes. 
141 Cited by Gareth Evans, Co-Chair of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty "The Responsibility to Protect: Humanitarian Intervention in the 21" Century" (2002 
Wesson Lecture in International Relations Theory and Practice, Stanford University, 27 February 
2002) <http://www.garethevans.dynamitc.com.au/speechtcxts/Stanford Wesson 27i i02 .htm> (last 
accessed 13 October 2002). 
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While many of the acts taken by states in response to genocide can point to the 
emergence of an obligation to intervene, not the least of which being the delibe
rate 
avoidance of the term genocide during the Rwandan crisis by America and 
the 
Security Council, the law and politics surrounding this are still too uncertain
 to 
convincing assert that a new rule of customary international law has developed. Th
ere 
are still too many holes in state practice, particularly in the area of direct and pu
blic 
statements asserting such an obligation - condemnation of failures to act, as
 in 
Rwanda, is not enough. 
For example, there would need to be evidence of a clear and express commitment 
by states to intervene - by all necessary means, up to and including the use of for
ce -
to prevent genocide. This could take several forms: 
• passing a General Assembly resolution to that effect; 
• a commitment added to the constituent document of an international
 
organization supporting the principle; 
• a statement or multilateral agreement on such an interpretation of the duty to
 
prevent between regional organisations; 
• a concerted attempt to examine the issue in many of the international genocide
 
prevention working groups that are sponsored by governments; 
• an amendment or protocol to the Genocide Convention 
• clear and decisive action in response to future cases of genocide seen to be
 
undertaken under a sense of binding legal obligation. 
In the end, no matter what the virtues of asserting an obligation to intervene as a 
natural corollary to the duty to prevent genocide, it will take much political wil
l to 
bring this to fruition. It should be remembered that sometimes it just takes one sm
all 
step for the rest to follow. In this light, the wise words of Judge Read are m
ost 
· 142 appropnate: 
It takes one bold act to transform the unthinkable into the thinkable, and a second
 or 
third to make it a normal course. 
Hopefully this one bold act will not wait for the next genocide, but rather b
e a 
decisive move to eradicate perceptions that intervention may once again be withhel
d. 
142 Cited by Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen in Application of the Convention 0 11 the 
Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Yugos
la via (Serbia and 
Montenegro)) Further Requests f or the Indication of Provisional Measures ( 13
 September 1993) 
[1 993] !CJ Reports 325, 369. 
Appendix/ 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948 
Articles I to IX 
The Contracting Parties, 
Having considered the declaration made by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations in its resolution 96 (I) dated 11 December 1946 that genocide is a crime 
under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and 
condemned by the civilized world, 
Recognizing that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on 
humanity, and 
Being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, 
international co-operation is required, 
Hereby agree as hereinafter provided: 
Article I: The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time 
of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to 
prevent and to punish. 
Article II: In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
( c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
Article III: The following acts shall be punishable: 
(a) Genocide; 
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; 
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; 
( d) Attempt to commit genocide; 
(e) Complicity in genocide. 
Article IV: Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in 
article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, 
public officials or private individuals. 
Article V: The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their 
respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of 
41 
the present Convention, and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons 
guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III. 
Article VI: Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in 
article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which 
the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have 
jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its 
jurisdiction. 
Article VII: Genocide and the other acts enumerated in article III shall not be 
considered as political crimes for the purpose of extradition. The Contracting Parties 
pledge themselves in such cases to grant extradition in accordance with their laws and 
treaties in force. 
Article VIII: Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the 
United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they 
consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of 
the other acts enumerated in article III. 
Article IX: Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, 
application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the 
responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article 
III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the 
parties to the dispute. 
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